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AUTHOR'S NOTE
O presente texto integrou um conjunto de quatro conferências que o historiador
brasileiro Roquinaldo Ferreira, na sua qualidade de professor visitante da FCS–UAN,
orientou em Luanda nos dias 2, 4, 5 e 6 de Dezembro de 2013, sob os auspícios do
Departamento de História da FCS–UAN.
1 In 1859, Governor of Angola José Rodrigues Coelho do Amaral held a gala dinner at the
governor palace in Luanda to celebrate the birthday of queen of Portugal Estefania that
brought together the crème de la crème of the Luanda elite.1 Six foreign consuls were
on attendance,  as well  as the highest echelon of the colonial  administration and of
Luanda’s society, including a controversial Brazilian named Francisco Antonio Flores,
who had played a critical role in the slave trade to first Brazil and then to Cuba. Flores
had  also  invested  in  legal  economics  projects,  contributing  to  shift  the  Angolan
economy away from the slave trade, had skillfully deployed cultural diplomacy to
persuade  African rulers  to  support  the  extension of  Portuguese  colonial  control  to
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Ambriz and Cabinda,  and had masterminded and funded the Portuguese expedition
that led to the extension of colonial control to Ambriz, a region long claimed by the
Portuguese but disputed by the British, American and French powers.
2 Flores was one of the most high profiles denizens of Luanda. In 1853, the Brazilian
national was said to have received interim Angolan governor Antonio Ricardo Graça to
«eat and drink» at his house.2 In the 1860s, he received the traveler Richard Burton, who
dined at his house and remarked that the Brazilian had also hosted Henry Huntley, a
British  diplomat  then serving  as  the  commissioner  on  the  comissão  mixta (BURTON
1876). In 1862, he received honorable mention at the London world fair for presenting
«interesting samples of cooper» (Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino 1867: 20).
3 Also in attendance was Flores’ nemesis, George Jackson, a British diplomat who had
recently retired from his position as British representative in the Comissão Mixta after
almost fifteen years in Luanda. The British had arrived in Luanda in 1845, already at
sixty years old man, after having lived as a diplomat in several European capitals and in
the United States. He had deeply knowledge of the slave trade, having already held the
position of judge on mixed commissions around the Atlantic:  «in  1828 he was named
commissary judge of the mixed commission court at Sierra Leone […] from 1832 to 1859, he was
chief commissioner — under the convention for the abolition of the African slave trade — first, at
Rio de Janeiro, until 1841, whence he was transferred to Surinam, and afterwards, from 1845, at
St. Paul de Loanda» (JACKSON ed., 1872: 2-4).
4 The two men’s bitter relationship was a microcosm of the larger struggle to end the
slave trade and of the imperial disputes between the Portuguese and the British over
territorial sovereignty in Ambriz and Cabinda. Scholars have stated that «in the middle
decades of the century the mixed commissions functioned more like arms of British imperial
authority than sites for diffusing humanitarian sentiment» (BENTON 2011: 369). In a way,
however, Jackson’s power in Luanda was not reflective of the overall British influence
in  the  city  since  the  arrival  of  the  first  British  diplomats  in  Luanda  in  the  1840s.
Another British diplomat, George Brand, had to wait almost one year before Portuguese
authorities  allowed  him  to  serve  on  the  mixed  the  commission.3 Edmond  Gabriel,
another  British  representative  in  Luanda,  once  declared:  «In  my  isolation  position,  I
seldom hear of anything until long after it has happened».4 
5 In contrast,  Jackson wielded incomparable influence in Luanda,  «forcefully  requesting
explanations about policies [from governors of Angola]». 5 To that end, he deployed not
only British considerable military and political power but also a network of local spies
that  supplied  him  with  intelligence  about  the slave  trade  and  Portuguese  colonial
projects:  «Sir  Jorge  Jackson  has  at  his  disposal  many  means  of  espionage  to  monitor  this
government’s  steps  on the  issue  of  Cabinda and Ambriz,  and I  have  been informed that  he
received an annual sum of three thousand pounds to maintain this espionage [network]».6
6 However, while British pressure had forced Flores into exile several times, the British
had been unable to completely prevent the Brazilian from developing tight connections
with the Luanda elite and from becoming a key partner to Portuguese colonial plans.
Unsurprisingly, the British diplomat did not react well when he spotted the Brazilian
businessman  in  the  gala  dinner.  As  Governor  of  Angola  José  Rodrigues  Coelho  do
Amaral pointed out, Jackson «walked up to the general secretary [Angola] and asked who
was that individual, as though he did not know him perfectly!, and once he heard his name, he
left with a big scene».7
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Early life in Luanda and business
7 Who exactly was Francisco Antonio Flores? The Brazilian had first gone to Angola in
the early 1840s. In 1843, official records showed him signing a bond attesting that a
ship that had departed from Luanda in ballast would not be involved in the slave trade.8
There is no doubt that by then he was already involved in the slave trade. In 1846, a
Portuguese consul in Rio de Janeiro informed authorities in Luanda that the ship that
Flores handled in Angola (General Rego) had left Rio for Angola.9 As a former slave
dealer would say several years later, «the brigue General Rego belonged to the slave trading
commercial house of Amaral e Bastos».10 Flores also had ties to the famed Manoel Pinto da
Fonseca, a Rio de Janeiro slave dealer who was the owner of a ship that used by Flores
to conduct trade between Luanda and other regions of coastal Angola (KARASCH 1967:
36).
8 Flores’ early career in Angola established a remarkably consistent pattern of business
operation  and  social  strategy.  He  invested  not  only  in  the  slave  trade  but  also  in
legitimate  activities,  requesting  licenses  to  import  cigars  (charutos),  tobacco,  sugar,
manioc, and Brazilian rum.11 While based in Luanda, he soon began investing in Ambriz
and Cabinda, establishing ties with African rulers that would later help him play an
important role as a diplomat on behalf of the Luanda administration. In his early years
in Luanda, he traveled several times to Ambriz and Cabinda. In 1846, for example, he
received a passport to travel to Cabinda, being then described as a twenty nine years
old Brazilian who had been born in Rio Grande [do Sul].12
9 A few years later, he traveled (with a mixed-race servant) to Ambriz, soon to become a
focal point for his business activities.13
10 He  quickly  integrated  in  Luanda’s  trading  community,  partnering  with  Francisco
Teixeira de Miranda, a Brazilian national who had arrived to Luanda in the late 1830s,
also as a representative of a Rio de Janeiro’s slave trade house. In 1842, after six years
living in the city, Miranda was described as a merchant who did «all quality of commerce
in partnership with a trading house from Rio de Janeiro and that he was more a volante than a
permanent merchant».14 Several months later, authorities stated that Miranda’s stay in
the city «was of great utility due not only to property taxes that he paid on his buildings but
also due to the amount of money he paid in custom duties». As the governor pointed out,
Miranda had also been a high-profile benefactor to the city.15
11 Miranda introduced Flores to several Luanda merchants, including Arsenio Pompílio
Pompeu de Carpo and Ana Joaquina dos Santos Silva, perhaps the largest slave dealers
in town in the 1840s. In 1843, the four partnered to establish a steam boat company
meant to export legal products from Angola to Portugal. To obtain support from the
Luanda  administration,  then  seeking  to  create  sources  of  revenues  alternative  to
shipments  of  slaves  from  Luanda,  they  argued  that  the  company  would  foster  the
transition from the slave trade to the licit trade in Angola.16 Later, however, the project
collapsed amid accusations that it was a hoax and that the merchants planned to use
the steam boat in the slave trade to Brazil.17
12 By the 1850s, the Brazilian had become perhaps the most important philanthropists in
Luanda. In 1855, for example, he donated four hundred thousand réis to the Santa Casa de
Misericórdia of  Luanda. 18 In 1856,  he donated food supplies to Luanda regular troop,
including «a portion  of  bottles  of  good  champagne,  cans  of  preserved  fruit  and sweets  for
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officers to eat as desert in their dinners».19 In 1857, through his agent Augusto Garrido, he
helped the Luanda administration to procure food supplies to Luanda.20 As pointed out
earlier,  his trading house was involved in fundraising to assist people stricken with
yellow fever in Lisbon.21
13 By then, Flores’ investments were backed by the Luanda administration or reflected the
geopolitical interests of the administration. In 1858, when Flores created a steamboat
company, authorities indicated the name of Joaquim Correia da Conceição to become
the Benguela representative of  the company.22 In  March 1856,  after  the Portuguese
occupation of Ambriz, he successfully requested rights to maintain three factories in
northern Angola at Ambrizete, Mangue and Porto da Lenha.23 Among the many goods
he sold in these establishments, were gunpowder and weapons.24 In addition, he would
regularly  receive  commodities  from  England,  which  were  later  distributed  to  his




14 The 1859 gala dinner incident was by no means the first confrontation between Flores
and the  British  representatives  in  Luanda.  In  1851,  the  Brazilian  had  already  been
expelled from Luanda due to British pressures on the grounds that he had ties to a slave
ship aprehended two years earlier.26 This apprehension highlighted Flores participation
in  the  then  booming  shipments  of  slaves  to  Cuba.  After  being  informed  of  Flores
involvement  with  the  slave  ship,  Portuguese  authorities  initially  rejected  British
pressures to arrest him, despite putting him under surveillance.27 Eventually, however,
they ordered him to leave Luanda.28 According to British diplomats, Flores had left for
Rio de Janeiro, leaving behind «only one of his clerks to wind up the business [in Luanda]».29
15 Instead of Brazil, however, the Brazilian relocated to Ambriz, a region only 150 miles
away from Luanda, outside Portuguese control but deeply connected to the capital city
of Angola. As British authorities reported, «Ambriz, which from being immediately beyond
the Portuguese territory and at the same time so near this place afforded such ample facilities to
the slave dealer that it might be considered the slave port of Luanda».30 In Ambriz, Flores
became the representative for Joaquim da Fonseca Guimarães e Companhia,  a slave
trading firm from Rio that organized shipments of slaves to Cuba. This firm was only
one of several Brazilian firms that began investing in the slave trade to Cuba after the
end of imports of slaves to Brazil in 1850. «The house of Manoel Pinto da Fonseca at Rio de
Janeiro is also connected with that of Pedro Martinez at Havana».31
16 In 1857 alone, the British reported the capture of 16 slave vessels: «the whole of these
vessels were engaged in the Cuban slave trade. Four of them had slaves on board at the time of
the destruction, all of which had been shipped in the vicinity of the river Congo»32 Much of this
trade  occurred  because  slave  dealers  used  the  American  flag  to  eschew  British
repression, taking advantage of the fact that the British could not legally apprehend
American vessels because they did not have an anti-slave trade to Britain. As early as
1850, governor of Angola Adrião Acácio da Silveira Pinto, the use of the American flag
turned the combat against the slave trade more difficult than when slave ships used the
Brazilian flag.33
17 This  situation  represented  a  serious  impediment  to  ending  the  transatlantic  slave
trade. Through diplomatic treaties, Britain had forced several countries to allow British
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ships the right of search — a critical tool to suppress the slave trade. However, «the
search of American vessels by British anti-slavery patrols remained unauthorized and the flag of
the United States remained a safe choice for slavers of all nations» (HUZZEY 2012: chapter
three;  OLDFIELD  2013:  chapter  seven).  The  United  States  government  was  deeply
suspicious about British abolitionism that was perceived by American slave holders as a
direct threat to the economic viability and international standing of the United States.
American’s  geopolitics  in  defense  of  slavery  ranged  from  Cuba,  where  geographic
proximity made British pressure against the slave trade particularly palpable, to more
remote Brazil (KARP 2011: 322).
18 It is important to emphasize that American involvement in the slave trade went well
beyond the use of  the American flag by slave dealers.  Indeed,  at  least  some of  the
vessels  used  to  transport  slaves  to  Cuba  belonged  to  American  investors.  The
Glamosgan, for example, belonged to the New York resident J. S. Hobson, «a name well
known in connection with slave trade enterprises  on this  coast,  and was commanded by an
American citizen name P. R. Stanhop».34 Another ship was named «the Reinder, belonging to
the house of H. J. Ingalss of New York, which has been lately sold, as we hear, to that of Machado
or Reis».35
19 Many of these vessels were built in the United States and sailed to Africa directly from
American cities such as Boston, New York, and New Orleans. As stated by known a slave
dealer, «the ship will be cheaper if bought in Baltimore and should sail under the American
flag».36 In 1854, the Glamorgan «sailed from NY on the 6th October and landed her cargo in
January partly in the Congo and partly in Ambriz».37 In 1861, the British reported that «a
schooner of about 70 tons called the Gilpins Brion is reported to have sailed within the last year
from the Congo with slaves directly to Cuba. This vessel was built in America and sent out here
by a Boston firm to facilitate the operations of  its  agents engaged in licit  commerce on this
coast».38
20 Since  at  least  the  1840s,  slave  dealers  had  been  using  American  built  vessels  to
transport  slaves  across  the  Atlantic.39 There  is  evidence,  however,  that  the  1850s
witnessed the introduction of a new generation of smaller and faster American vessels
in the slave trade. As British authorities pointed out, «when the trade was brisk and plenty
of vessels coming over to carry the slaves away, the employment of these small crafts was, I
believe, seldom heard of».40 Later, however, authorities remarked that «these apprehensions
[of slave vessels off the coast of Angola], though for a time abated, have led very generally to
a new mode of doing business», much of which rested on the use of small vessels built in
the United States.41 In 1850, for example, the Benguela-based Manoel Antonio Teixeira
Barboza purchased a ship in New York to transport slaves from Benguela to Brazil.42
21 The use of American ships gave slave dealers a technological edge that significantly
reduced  the  efficacy  of  the  warships  patrolling  the  African  coast  against  the  slave
trade. According to the Portuguese, one third of the American built vessels were able to
escape British cruises.43 However, the evidence suggests that the number might have
been much larger. In 1853, for example, the commander of American vessels cruising
against the slave trade sent a letter to the US requesting that smaller vessels be sent to
cruise along the Angolan coast.44 In 1854, they were said to be «far superior to those of
that brig or probably of any cruisers on the coast».45 In 1857, the British described a ship
captured in Ambriz as «a remarkably fine vessel  of  350 tons measurement and capable of
carrying a thousand slaves».46
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22 Most importantly,  there is profuse evidence of Flores’  participation in shipments of
slaves  in  Ambriz.  In  1853,  for  example,  British  authorities  reported:  «the  barracons
containing these slaves belong principally to Francisco Antonio Flores and that they are situated
not on Ambriz point but at a native town a few miles in the interior in such a position as to
afford great facility for marching the slaves to any point on the adjacent coast for embarkation».
47 He became associated with several episodes of shipments of slaves to Cuba, including
a ship named Silenns that  managed to leave with six  hundred seventy slaves from
Ambriz despite being registered by a British warship.48 He was also connected to the
Republic, a vessel that «entered this port [Luanda], 80 days from New York».49
23 While in Ambriz, Flores established tight connections with slave dealers in cities such
as New York, Rio de Janeiro, and Lisbon, contributing to further internationalize the
slave trade to Cuba. As the British reported, «a company with ramifications at Lisboa for the
purpose of carrying on the slave trade to the Havana on a large scale» had been created. «The
two principal agents at Rio de Janeiro are, first, the house of Joaquim da Fonseca Guimarães e
Companhia, who are said still to retain large establishments in Angola and at Ambriz under the
supervision of Francisco Antonio Flores and (2st) Senhor Brandão».50
24 Flore’s transatlantic connections surfaced after the apprehension of the Mary Smith off
the coast of Brazil (Bahia), after a trip across the Atlantic that cost the lives of 100
Africans.51 Built in Boston, this vessel belonged to Francisco Rivairoza, «a slave dealer
who lived in Rio de Janeiro and who had his brother stationed in Angola, and was part of the fleet
of slave vessels owned by New York based Machado, who also owned Republic, Isla de Cuba,
Vickery, Charlotte».52 This trip also highlighted Flores’ close association with Cuban slave
dealers and the fact that the slave trade to Cuba was at least in part organized from Rio
de Janeiro.
25 Despite being in Ambriz and unable to enter Luanda, Flores remained tightly connected
to Luanda, where foreign slave dealers would use his house to organize shipments of
slaves to Cuba. In 1853, for example, a man named José de Sá Miranda, «who so long
figured as the head of the slave trade interests at this place, and eventually established himself
at Rio de Janeiro», arrived in Luanda with «a large sum, said to be not less than fifty contos of
réis, in gold, and is now living at Flores’ house».53
 
African engagement
26 It  is  important  to  emphasize  that  Portuguese  relations  with  Flores  were  strikingly
different  from  general  policy  towards  slave  dealers.  In  1856,  for  example,  the
Portuguese government had issued a decree ordering the expulsion of notorious slave
dealers from Portuguese Africa.54 In 1859, José Mendes Afonso, the highest judge in
Luanda, advocated the highest punishment short of capital punishment to individuals
implicated in slave dealing.55 Nor did Flores’  presence in Luanda reflect  Portuguese
immigration policy towards Brazilian nationals.  In 1845, authorities established that
Brazilians would not be allowed to enter Angola without permission from the governor
of Angola.56
27 Yet,  Luanda  authorities  not  only  warmly  welcomed  Flores  into  Luanda  but  also
persistently defied British pressures to expel the Brazilian national from Angola.  In
1853, Jackson and Gabriel wrote that «Governors of this province have severally declared
themselves  under  the  necessity  of  tolerating,  because  he  was  residing  here  under  a  special
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license from her most faithful majesty, and because no positive proof of his complicity in slave
traffic  had  been  adduced  against  him».57 Indeed,  Governor  José Rodrigues  Coelho  do
Amaral would openly discard British antagonism towards Flores in 1859, attributing it
dissatisfaction  over  Flores’  support  to  the  Portuguese  military  expedition  that  had
taken control of Ambriz in 1855.58
28 How to explain Portuguese authorities’ behavior? Portugal’s willingness to antagonize
the British, the world’s major naval power, even as the British seized territories in West
Africa and exercised military power elsewhere in the Atlantic, derived from the pivotal
role that Flores played as an architect of policies to consolidate Portuguese influence in
Ambriz and Cabinda, where the Brazilian had extensive contacts with African chiefs. In
1853, for example, authorities stated that they had «decided to accept the offer of Francisco
Antonio Flores to travel to Ambriz due to his influence in this point and constant willingness to
help me with this extremely important question».59
29 To  fully  appreciate  Flores’  role  in  advancing  colonial  policies,  it  is  necessary  to
understand Portuguese concerns about Ambriz and Cabinda. Despite Portugal’s claims
of  sovereignty  rights,  Portuguese  influence  in  Ambriz  was  minimal,  with  the
Portuguese particularly fearful about growing British presence in these regions. In fact,
Ambriz had long been marked by international trade. By the early 1830s, for example, it
was mostly dominated by «American and British ships», as well as Spanish and Brazilian
ships.60 Recognizing  the  growing  importance  of  Ambriz  and  Cabinda  to  the
continuation of the then illegal slave trade, the Portuguese stated that «if these ports
were not occupied, the decree of December 10 1836 would be evaded».61
30 According to Lisbon, Portuguese sovereignty in Ambriz and Cabinda had been granted
by  treaty  between  Portugal  and  Britain  from  1817.  As  a  result,  Lisbon  instructed
Governor Noronha to occupy the «foz of the river Zaire» where a city named new Lisbon
would be founded on the «well  founded hope that it  will  grow in commerce,  wealth,  and
population, making it deserving of this denomination».62 However, it soon became obvious
that not only the Luanda administration lacked the military means to these enforce
plans but that the growing trade between Luanda and Ambriz might threaten the flow
of  primary  goods  from  the  Angolan  country  to  Luanda.63 In  addition  to  depriving
Luanda of duties over commercial activities, the latter channeled to Ambriz goods that
otherwise would be taken to Luanda, thus affecting Angolan transition from the slave
trade to legitimate commerce.64 By the end of the 1840s, Luanda merchants sought to
legalize trade relations with Ambriz, even offering to pay duties in advance so as to be
allowed to trade in Ambriz.65
31 Crucially,  the  increasing  number  of  foreign  traders  represented  an  open  threat  to
Portuguese claimed sovereignty rights. «Three fortifications of as many nations are erected
on the bluff above mentioned; they are American, English and Sardinian» (GILLILAND 2003:
144-145). In 1841, American merchants refused to pay duties to the Portuguese on the
grounds that «Portugal did not have more rights than other nations [trading] in that place
[Ambriz]  and because  they  paid [duties]  to  the  king  of  gentios,  they  owed nothing  to  the
government of the province [of Angola]». 66 Further complicating Portuguese projects to
gain  a  firmer  foothold  there,  the  number  of  foreigners  in  Ambriz  increased  as
shipments  of  slaves  came  to  an  end  in  Luanda.  In  1845,  for  example,  authorities
admitted that it would be impossible build the fort without «grave commotions» with
France, Britain, and the United States.67 
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32 In addition to military means, the British anchored their anti-slave trade operations on
treaties with African chiefs that prohibited shipments of slaves and gave British traders
an edge in the development of «licit commerce». «If the treaties with the chiefs of Cabenda
and Ambriz could be enforced by us, it would be of vast benefit,  and more particularly with
Ambriz» (MATSON 1848: 75). A traveler who visited Angola in the 1850s stated that «The
country  of  Angola  extends  from  the  southern  border  of  Congo  to  the  northern  border  of
Benguela», yet «England has disputed» it (THOMAS 1860). In fact, Britain never challenged
Portuguese control over Luanda and Benguela.  However,  it  certainly harbored open
and  not  so  opened  reservations  about  Portuguese.  In  1859,  Portuguese  authorities
reported that «Edmond Gabriel is a decided adversary of the extension of our control to the
north» of Ambriz.68 
33 Against this backdrop, the Portuguese developed a policy of active engagement with
African  rulers  so  as  to  decrease  the  perils  of  foreign  presence.  In  1839,  Lisbon
specifically  instructed  recently  appointed  Governor  Noronha:  «it  is  necessary  to
strengthen ties with the prince and with the Mangobo Grande, who speaks English. In Cabinda
[it would be necessary to establish ties], with the Mafuca Franque, who has been to Nantes,
and who is already very friendly with the Portuguese».69 It is important to point out that
Franque had «received a good education in the Brazils and has been for many years a notorious
slave dealer» and would become particularly close of Franque.70
34 The  relationship  with  the  Franque  family  became  an  essential  piece  of  Portuguese
diplomacy  with  African  chiefs  in  Cabinda.  In  1853,  for  example,  Governor  Amaral
stated: «I have tried all means to convince them [to support Portuguese rights over Ambriz
and Cabinda], adopting all measures to provide for their wellbeing, and offering titles, hábitos
and any other gift».71 Two years later, the governor wrote to Franque to say: «we trust God
that it is not late to once and for all settle Portuguese sovereignty over Cabinda». Governor
Amaral then went on to ensure the African ruler that «the services that you might conduct,
as well as those who you have already conducted, will be duly rewarded with the generosity with
which that her majesty treats her loyal subjects».72 
35 It  is  important to emphasize that this diplomacy took place in a context of intense
suspicion against British intents.  In 1856, for example,  rumors circulated in Luanda
that the «British had educated in Santa Helena some Cabindas who had been released of a slave
vessel» and planned to use them to foster a pro-British revolt.73 In response, the Luanda
administration dispatched a warship to consult  with Francisco Franque and Manoel
Puna and «obtain intelligence that could be useful in this regard».74
36 Portuguese diplomacy towards African had gained momentum in 1853, when Luanda
authorities  received  news  that  British  warship  Athol  had  disembarked  troops  «in
Cabinda and taken control of that place, hoisting the British flag and removing the Portuguese
flag».75 According  to  Portuguese  reports,  the  British  had  gone  to  « the  house  of  the
Mambuco and invited him to drink rum, which he accepted, drinking something that he made
him intoxicated». Afterwards, the British had made the Cabinda ruler sign a document
giving the British territorial rights over Cabinda.76 In a letter to Luanda, Franque said:
«what the government of her majesty needs to do as soon as possible is to deploy a military
detachment  and  build [here]». 77 Most  importantly,  because  he  had  known  Franque
personally since the beginning of his investments in Cabinda in the late 1840s, Flores
played a crucial role in this diplomacy. Significantly, it was through Flores that Franque
would  request  the  deployment  of  Portuguese  troops  to  Cabinda  so  that  a  possible
British intrusion could be avoided and Portuguese sovereignty could be consolidated.78
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Portuguese occupation of Ambriz
37 Given Flores’ influence, it is perhaps unsurprising that he was also one of the architects
and  primary  supporters  of  the  perhaps  most  important  Portuguese  geopolitical
accomplishment in the 1850s: the occupation of Ambriz.79 While Lisbon contributed two
hundred and fifty soldiers,  the vast  majority was recruited locally,  including forces
contributed by jaga Calandula, signaling the fact that the expedition largely reflected
local interests by Luanda elites and merchants.80 Five hundred soldiers embarked on
brigues Serra do Pilar, Vila Flor, and escuna Cabo Verde, including governor of Angola
José  Rodrigues  Coelho  do  Amaral,  who returned to  Luanda  from Ambriz  while  the
expedition marched on to Bembe.81 
38 What was Flores’ exact role in the expedition? He not only participated in the planning
of  the  expedition  and  contributed  food  supplies  to  the  troops.82 Lisbon  authorities
actively  reached  out  to  the  slave  dealer,  then  living  in  exile  in  Lisbon,  to  obtain
information about Ambriz. In a letter to the Visconde de Sá da Bandeira, Flores laid out
an expansive view of Portuguese presence in the «Zaire region» between Ambriz and
Molembo. «In my view, a fortress should be built in Padrão and Boma. Later, and when there is
no longer any difficulty for the Portuguese to designate Cabinda as their territory, it would be
sensible to establish a colony in Cabinda, where the climate is better, using a place where there
had been a fortress» in the past.83
39 In  Luanda,  Flores’  representative  Garrido was  one of  the  only  three individuals  (in
addition to the head of the Portuguese naval station in Luanda and Francisco Salles
Ferreira) who participated of the key meeting that governor of Angola José Rodrigues
Coelho do Amaral conducted before troops left Luanda.84 Significantly, a decree from
November 7, 1855 determined that Flores should pay for the military detachment in
Bembe for one year, beginning on January 1, 1857.85
40 While significantly enhancing Portuguese interests in Ambriz, the expedition damaged
British and American trade there. In 1856, British diplomats reported that «the invoice
value of the British imports at that port during the year 1856 amounted to L25.913.00, and a
considerable quantity of goods has also been imported there for lawful trade in the same period
under  the  American  flag».86 In  the  wake  of  the  Portuguese  expedition  to  Ambriz,
however,  British  merchants  petitioned  the  Portuguese  government  for  financial
compensations for their losses.87 Indeed, financial impact on British business was such
that British authorities stated that the occupation would only be recognized if  «the
interest  of  the  British  merchants  especially  those  already  established  at  Ambriz  shall  be
secured».88 
41 To continue trading, many American and British moved to «a place  called  Kinsembo,
about three miles north of the river Loje, which is rapidly absorbing the whole commerce of the
former  place [Ambriz]».  However,  the  Luanda  administration  acted  to  counter  this
strategy by deploying Flores’ trading house, which would offer African traders better
prices than the British and Americans were willing to pay for ivory and other African
products. According to the British, Flores’ «agent here [Ambriz] has established a factory
at a short distance from those mines where, with the strenuous support and patronage of this
government, he succeeded in cutting off a considerable portion of the product [ivory] from the
interior to the great detriment and injury of the [British and American] trade at Kinsembo».89
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42 In 1857, a Portuguese mission registered 19 factories along the coast of Ambriz and
Congo River:  12  were  Portuguese,  two were  American,  three  were  British,  one  was
French and one was Spanish.  Most  of  these factories  (13)  were located in Porto da
Lenha,  while  two factories  were  located  in  Ambrizete,  one  was  in  Cabinda,  two  in
Chimbica and one in Mangue Grande.90 To appease the British, the Portuguese extended
to them and the Americas the same fiscal regime used to collect import and export
duties from Portuguese ships. However, there is no question that the expedition had
achieved  its  commercial  and  geopolitical  objective  by  bolstering  Portuguese  trade
while undercutting foreign trade in Ambriz.
 
Beyond Ambriz
43 The Ambriz occupation was part of a larger project to extend Portuguese influence
beyond Ambriz, with Flores as a key figure helping the Luanda administration to devise
and execute such policies. As Flores pointed out, «the ponto limite, it seems to me, should
be Molembo, where a fort should also be built».91 It led to the development of far more
assertive policies towards regions neighboring Angola, particularly the king of Congo.
In 1858, for example, the Luanda administration sent three envoys (Zacarias da Silva
Cruz e  Father  José  Maria  de  Moraes  Gavião  and Father  José  Agostinho Ferreira)  to
Congo on a political and diplomatic mission meant to influence the election of the new
king of Congo.92 
44 Significantly, the funds that allowed the three representatives to undertake their trip
was  provided  by  Francisco  Antonio  Flores’s  trading  house.93 According  to  Luanda
authorities,  «we  will  slowly  proceed  to  the  absolute  dominium  if  the  circumstances [the
election of Catende] are favorable». If not, «we will have to consider our resources in terms of
protecting what we already have there, or become aggressive in his own territory. This would not
be easy in the present circumstances».94 However, the succession process degenerated into
a  crisis  pitting  Catende  against  Dongo.  While  considering  a  military  expedition  to
Congo, the Luanda administration stated that Catende and his followers could supply
«an indigenous  force  sufficient  to  operate  with  ours» and then march «towards  that  city
[Mbanza Congo]».95
45 To curb this revolt, the Portuguese sent a force that killed forty of Dongo’s followers
and occupied Mbanza Congo in 1860. According to official accounts, «Africans battled
with great resolution but succumbed to the value of our soldiers». In fact, the Portuguese won
due to the combination of artillery power and the deployment of cavalry forces.96 After
this expedition, Luanda authorities declared that the Portuguese flight was flutuando
in the Congo, «where our troops had been able to expel the faction of the rebel prince and
destroy  their  banzas  and  settlements».  Portuguese  soldiers  would  remain  in  Congo  to
protect  the  new  king  of  Congo.  If  they  withdrew,  they  argued,  the  ruler  could
overthrow and «we would come under the threat of losing Bembe, Encoje, and even Ambriz»,
as well as positions in Congo and Banza-a-Puto.97
46 More importantly, Flores played a critical role in the expedition to Mbanza, like he had
done in all other diplomatic and military maneuvering by the Luanda administration in
the previous decade. The Brazilian merchant even participated in sessions of the Junta
of Governo of Angola to discuss the occupation of Bembe, joining recently appointed
governor of Angola José Rodrigues Coelho do Amaral and other authorities.98 Together
with Garrido, Flores accompanied the disembark of troops in Ambriz and, as Luanda
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authorities admitted,  demonstrated more knowledge about the region than colonial
administrators in charge of Ambriz. According to Amaral, «the [military] expedition left
for Ambriz thanks to the good work of Francisco Antonio Flores, always tireless, and his partner
Augusto Garrido, who had given all support and co-shared decisions by the government».99
 
Conclusion
47 The relationship between British diplomat George Jackson and Brazilian slave dealer
Francisco  Antonio  Flores  sheds  critical  light on  imperial  disputes  in  Angola  and
neighboring  regions  in  the  last  phase  of  the  slave  trade.  Firstly,  Flores’  trajectory
provides  glimpses  into  the  expanding  transatlantic  networks  of  the  Angolan  slave
trade.  Secondly,  it  illustrates  rivalries  over  the delineation of  sovereignty rights  in
Angola, since Flores seems to have earned British hostility not only because of his slave
trade activities but also because he had been one of the architects of colonial policies
towards Ambriz. Thirdly, the incident is also significant because of the ambiguous role
that Flores played in the promotion of the legal activities that replaced the slave trade
in Angola. My analysis demonstrates that colonial settings were incubators of colonial
policies, which were devised not only in Lisbon but could also be born or enhanced on
the ground by colonial administrators and local elites.
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ABSTRACTS
This article deals with the conquest of Ambriz in the 1850s. It places it in the broader conquest of
the end of the transatlantic slave trade in Angola and Ambriz, as well as imperial in the context
of fierce disputes that pitted the Portuguese against the British in the region. The article argues
that  Portuguese colonial  expansion towards Ambriz was part  of  broader plans to strengthen
colonial ties to Angola that began with the end of the transatlantic slave trade. To understand the
conquest  of  Ambriz,  the  article  reconstructs  the  relationship  between the  Brazilian  investor
Francisco Antonio Flores and the British diplomat George Jackson.
Este artigo trata da conquista de Ambriz na década de 1850. Esta é colocada no panorama mais
amplo do fim do tráfico transatlântico de escravos em Angola e Ambriz, bem como no contexto
de acirradas disputas imperiais que opunham os portugueses aos britânicos na região. O artigo
argumenta que a expansão colonial portuguesa em direcção a Ambriz fazia parte de planos mais
amplos  para  fortalecer  os  laços  coloniais  com  Angola,  que  começou  com  o  fim  do  tráfico
transatlântico  de  escravos.  Para  compreender  a  conquista  de  Ambriz,  o  artigo  reconstrói  a
relação entre o investidor brasileiro Francisco Antônio Flores e o diplomata britânico George
Jackson.
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